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ASSESSING AND ADDRESSING
THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY LIFE
TENURE ON THE SUPREME COURT
Philip D. Oliver*
All would agree that the Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States collectively exercise enormous power. Only
slightly less obvious is the fact that, given the frequency of five-
to-four decisions, especially in the most important and
controversial cases, each individual Justice is an important
political actor. Writing half a century ago, Professor Frank
opined that "the individual Supreme Court Justice probably has
more actual power than any other individual in American public
life except the President."' Some might dispute this precise
assertion-observers have sometimes given the number two
ranking to the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, for
example. 2 On the other hand, people with an interest in the law
might argue that, after the President, the most important
American decisionmaker over the past several years has been
Justice Kennedy. And on the momentous day last summer when
the Court upheld "Obamacare," no one doubted the importance
of Chief Justice Roberts. Regardless of the precise pecking
*Byron M. Eiseman Distinguished Professor of Tax Law, University of Arkansas at Little
Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law. I appreciate the research assistance provided by
Mr. Jerry Unser of the Bowen class of 2014, and the thoughtful comments provided by
Professors Ranko Shiraki Oliver and Joshua Silverstein.
1. John P. Frank, Marble Palace: The Supreme Court in American Life 8-9 (Knopf
1958).
2. Forbes, which provides various rankings of the rich and powerful, recently ranked
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke as the fourth most powerful person on the planet,
and the second most powerful American, behind only President Obama. (Hu Jintao,
President of the People's Republic of China, and Vladimir Putin, Russian Prime Minister,
were ranked second and third on the world stage, between Obama and Bemanke.) Michael
Noer, The Most Powerful People on Earth, 10 Forbes 86 (2010).
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order, it is obvious that the identity of the individuals who sit on
the Supreme Court is quite important to the country.
Justices, like other Article III federal judges, enjoy life
tenure.3 In this article, I contend that such life tenure is an
anachronism that poses various problems, at least on the
Supreme Court; that there is reason to believe that these
problems are increasing; that life tenure is not justified by our
legitimate concern for judicial independence; and that, therefore,
either life tenure for Supreme Court Justices should be ended, or
the adverse effects of life tenure be reduced by less drastic
measures.
I. LIFE TENURE IS AN ANACHRONISM.
Unquestionably, life tenure is a uniquely powerful way of
guaranteeing the independence of Supreme Court Justices from
political pressures. But this benefit must be weighed against its
extremely anti-democratic nature.
I seriously question that we would opt for life tenure for
Justices if we were drafting our Constitution today. I am
unaware of any other country that uses a system of life tenure
for its judges.4 Admittedly, foreign practice alone is not reason
for us to abandon life tenure. But, particularly given that the
American system of government is known and admired
throughout the world, it is interesting that apparently no one else
follows this practice.
At the time that the Constitution was drafted, it would have
been easy to regard life tenure as a step forward. In the personal
memory of the drafters, judges had served at the pleasure of the
Crown, a practice wholly at odds with any notion of an
3. U.S. Const. art. III, § I (providing that "[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour," which has almost
uniformly been understood to equate to effective life tenure) (available at http://www
.senate.gov/civics/constitutionitem/constitution.htm#a t).
4. See e.g. Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme
Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 769, 821 (2006) ("[E]very
other major democratic nation that we know of-all of which drafted their respective
constitutions or otherwise established their supreme constitutional courts after 1789-has
chosen not to follow the American model of guaranteeing life tenure to justices equivalent
to those on our highest court.").
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independent judiciary.5 The regard for judicial independence
that led the Constitutional drafters to opt for life tenure was
apparently persuasive in the states as well. Eight of the original
thirteen states gave their judges life tenure,6 as did eight of the
eleven states admitted before 1830. 7 But as the Nineteenth
Century wore on, concern about the anti-democratic nature of
life tenure came to be seen as more important, with the result
that state after state abandoned life tenure. By a fairly recent
count, judges in forty-six states "face some form of electoral
review." 8 Apparently only one state-Rhode Island-maintains
a system of life tenure equivalent to that enjoyed by United
States Supreme Court Justices.9
Consideration of the structure of the entire federal
government suggests that more than a concern for judicial
independence underlay the adoption of life tenure. Democratic
self-government was a largely untested project, and the framers
were treading lightly in all branches of government. In the
executive, the President was not to be elected by the people. The
electoral college arrangement allocated votes to the states, and
the electors were to be "appoint[ed], in such Manner as the
legislature thereof may direct." 0 Even assuming that the
legislature opted for popular election, the people would be
trusted only to the extent of allowing them to select the
distinguished men of the various states who would, in turn,
choose the President. I' In the past two centuries, political and
5. This lack of independence was among the colonial grievances that led to the
Revolutionary War. Arthur Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: Their Functions, Qualifications
and Selection 21 (Boston U. Press 1956).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal
Judiciary, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 233, 275-76 (1988).
9. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra n. 4, at 821.
10. U.S. Const. art. II, § I (available at http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitutionitem
/constitution.htm#al )).
11. In addition to providing for an indirect method of election, the electoral college has
the effect of slightly increasing the relative weight of smaller states. If State X has three
Representatives, State Y, with five times as much population, will have fifteen members. In
a system of direct popular election for the President, one would expect that State Y would
influence the outcome about five times as much as State X. But in the electoral college,
State X will have five votes and State Y seventeen, or considerably less than five times the
weight given State X.
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legal changes have rendered the electoral college merely a
quaint way of counting the popular vote.
12
Limited democracy is also apparent in the legislative
branch. While the House of Representatives has always been
popularly elected, the Senate-which is, it should be noted, the
more powerful body 13-is another matter. For over a century,
Senators were chosen by state legislatures, until 1913, when the
increased taste for popular sovereignty led to adoption of the
Seventeenth Amendment.
While other branches of the federal government have
become more democratic since the Constitution was drafted, the
judiciary has, if anything, become less so. The only real check
on the power of the judiciary provided by the Constitution is the
power of impeachment,' 4 but no Justice has ever been removed
from office. Indeed, over two hundred years ago, President
Jefferson came to the conclusion that the impeachment power
was a "scarecrow."
t15
In every aspect of government, a balance must be struck
between two values, both of which are desirable. First, we
would prefer to provide policymakers sufficient protection from
12. Rarities such as the election of 2000, in which the popular vote winner lost the
electoral college vote, offer zero support for the idea that we do not at present trust the
people to elect the President. At most, the present role of the electoral college represents a
commitment to a continuing role for states in the Presidential election. More likely, our
present arrangement marks the present stage of the progression from an indirect process
distrustful of democracy to a fully democratic election. Because the electoral college and
the popular vote almost always yield the same result, continued adherence to the electoral
college could be placed in the "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" category. Indeed, I ask the
reader: Is there any chance whatever that we would include the electoral college in our
Constitution if we were starting over?
13. Both branches must concur in order for a statute to be enacted. But the Senate has a
wide range of powers not shared by the House. The most important of these is the power of
advice and consent to the making of treaties and to the appointment of ambassadors and
other officials of the executive branch. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 (available at http://www
.senate.gov/civics/constitution item/constitution.htm#al)). And, of course, relevant to the
subject of this article, the Senate must consent to the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices and other federal judges. Id.
14. Impeachment is structured to be difficult. The power is divided between the two
houses of Congress. The House of Representatives has the power to impeach, after which
the Senate must convict by a two-thirds vote. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (vesting power of
impeachment in House); art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (vesting power to try all impeachments in Senate)
(available at http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution item/constitution.htm#al ).
15. Courts, Judges, and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process 552 (Walter
F. Murphy & C. Herman Pritchett eds., Random House 1961).
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political pressures in order that they be able to do what they
think best. But this argument can carry us too far. Rule by an
enlightened despot can be viewed as an ideal governmental
system, because the despot can make desirable changes that
might be blocked by a political system more responsive to
popular will. 16 However, a second value, fundamental from our
founding, is that "Governments are instituted among Men
deriving their just powers from the consent of the govemed."'
The system of life tenure finds strong support from the first
principle, but gives short shrift to the second. This raises the
following question: Given the undemocratic nature of life
tenure, how much protection of the Court from political
influence is desirable?
II. HOW MUCH INDEPENDENCE
FROM THE POLITICAL PROCESS?
The makeup of the Supreme Court is determined by the
political process. If we truly find impingement of the political
process on the proper functioning of the Supreme Court to be
corrupting, such political involvement could be avoided. For
example, if a vacancy on the Court arose, the existing Justices-
individuals whom defenders of life tenure apparently trust to act
independently of the political process-could select a new
Justice, rather than leaving that important decision to the crass
politicians in the White House and the Senate. The remaining
Justices could act much as the College of Cardinals in selecting
a new Pope. Although judicial independence would be quite
well vindicated-the Court could make its important decisions
almost wholly independent from the political, processes that
otherwise govern the country-I suggest that few defenders of
16. Peter the Great moved Russia toward modernization far more effectively than
would have been possible had he been forced to make his decisions palatable to the nobility
of his empire, not to speak of the populace.
In contemporary America, any reader can think of numerous examples of desirable
(to the reader) change that is frustrated by the political process. Some might name more
effective action against global warming as a policy that enlightened policymakers
unencumbered by political considerations might implement. My own personal favorite
would be legalization of drugs. The list could be extended almost infinitely.
17. Declaration of Independence 2 (U.S. 1776) (available at http://www.archives.gov/
/exhibits/charters/declaration transcript.html).
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life tenure would want to carry things quite so far. We all desire
judicial independence, but we also desire a Court that is
ultimately shaped by the political processes of the country. The
question is how we achieve an appropriate balance. Those who
simply repeat the mantra that we desire "an independent
judiciary" avoid the real issue.
Nonetheless, I do not merely concede but emphatically
endorse the idea that judicial independence is an important
value. If the only considerations were judicial independence
versus desirability of governing by consent of the governed, I
would regard the question of life tenure as close. Unfortunately,
life tenure on the Supreme Court carries with it several problems
that even defenders of judicial independence should find
troubling. A lengthy but fixed term could provide substantial
judicial independence while avoiding or lessening these
problems.
III. PERNICIOUS EFFECTS OF LIFE TENURE
Life tenure carries one very serious, and unavoidable,
problem, which I believe most defenders of life tenure would
concede to be a problem. In addition, there are a number of
lesser consequences that, in my view, constitute additional
reasons to be concerned about life tenure.
A. Justices Time Their Retirements to Assure the Appointment
of Like-Minded Replacements.
"Life tenure" usually does not mean that Justices remain on
the Court until death, of course. Most Justices choose to retire at
some point. But, unlike most of us who are likely to base the
timing of the decision to retire almost entirely on personal
factors, Justices may well time their retirement decisions to
increase the likelihood that their replacements on the Court will
continue, in a general sense, to represent their viewpoints. I do
not wish to overstate this factor. It seems reasonable to assume
that most Justices will stay on the Court as long as they find the
work rewarding, and retire shortly thereafter. (Justices need not
consider the need for earnings, no doubt the overriding factor in
the timing of retirement for most people, because they receive
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their salary for life. 18) But many retirement decisions based
entirely on personal factors might reasonably be made at any
point over a period of a few years. If a Justice might choose, for
personal reasons, to retire at some point during a several-year
period, there seems to be every reason to believe that the Justice
would prefer to time his' 9 departure to coincide with the
administration of a President likely to appoint a new Justice who
would, in general terms, share the judicial philosophy of the
outgoing Justice. If the Justice does not die unexpectedly, or
suffer a serious and sudden decline that cannot be ignored,
timing retirement with this consideration is mind is likely to be
successful. Only once in the past sixty years has one party held
the White House for more than eight years at a stretch. This
suggests that a Justice with any skill whatever at reading the
political tea leaves is likely to be able, by moving up or back his
retirement by only a couple of years from the personally desired
date, to get the "right" President to name his replacement.
How often this happens we cannot say with any assurance.
Precisely because many people might think such a consideration
by a Justice illegitimate, Justices are unlikely to reveal that this
factor played a role in the timing of their retirement decision.
Only rarely will Justices be so unguarded as Justice Douglas,
who was quoted as having said: "I won't resign while there's a
breath in my body-until we get a Democratic President., 20 But
history surely affords other examples. Sometimes Justices will
advance their retirements, as did Chief Justice Warren 21 and
22perhaps Chief Justice Burger.
18. The Justice must have at least fifteen years of service and have attained age sixty-
five, or ten years of service at age seventy. Between the ages of sixty-five and seventy, the
service requirement is reduced by one year for each additional year of age. 28 U.S.C. § 371
(available at http://uscode.house.gov).
19. This article uses the masculine pronoun where gender is indefinite. At a time when
women comprise one third of the Supreme Court, it is unfortunate that the English
language does not provide a simple sex-neutral third-person-singular pronoun.
20. Douglas Finally Leaves the Bench, Time 69 (Nov. 24, 1975). Douglas's departure
from the bench is filled with irony. Not only did he finally find it necessary to retire with a
Republican in the White House, but that Republican was Gerald Ford, who, while in
Congress, had taken part in an attempt to impeach Douglas. Yet, Ford's choice to replace
Douglas was John Paul Stevens. It is unlikely that Douglas could have hoped for a
successor-even one appointed by a liberal Democrat-whose decisions on the Court
would have more closely reflected Douglas's liberal philosophy.
21. Warren, though a Republican, felt far more aligned with the Democratic party by
the end of his tenure with the Court. Anticipating President Nixon's election in 1968, he
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There is also evidence that a number of Justices have
delayed their retirements in an attempt to wait for a like-minded
President who would name a new Justice who shared the retiring
Justice's philosophy. Chief Justice Taft concluded that despite
being "older and slower and less acute and more confused," he
"must stay on the court in order to prevent the Bolsheviki from
getting control., 23 Chief Justice Stone presided in open court a
few hours before his death; Stone's son surmised that he "would
be surprised" if his father "had not thought of staying on long
enough for a Republican President to be able to appoint his
successor."
24
Judging only by their actions, the most recent departures
from the Court may well have fit in this pattern. Justices Souter
and Stevens, two of the more liberal justices on the Court,
appear to have waited for President George W. Bush to leave the
White House in order that a more liberal President could name
their replacements. Perhaps not. But it is suggestive that Justice
Souter announced his retirement only three months after
President Obama's inauguration. Justice Stevens waited until
attempted to resign in time for President Johnson to replace him as Chief with Associate
Justice Fortas, and replace Fortas with another Associate Justice with a similar liberal
philosophy. In the event, the plan fell apart following revelations of ethically questionable
actions by Fortas, with the result that both Warren and Fortas left the Court by 1969, both
to be replaced by Nixon. See e.g. Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief 680-83, 720-25 (N.Y.U.
Press 1983); G. Edward White, Earl Warren: A Public Life 306-08 (Oxford U. Press
1982).
22. Chief Justice Burger's stated reason for leaving the Court in 1986 was that he was
to head the commission for the celebration of the bicentennial of the Constitution-surely
an unusual career move. According to unnamed "sources familiar with the process,"
Burger was also concerned that if he waited another year, even though President Reagan
would still be in the White House, Democrats might have gained control of the Senate in
the off-year elections of 1986. In that case, "[a] Democratic-controlled Senate would be far
less amenable to confirming conservative Reagan-appointed Justices." Stephen Wermiel,
Changes on High Court Are Likely to Increase Conservatives' Clout, Wall St. J. 23 (June
18, 1986). Such a concern would appear to have been well founded. In 1987, Judge Robert
Bork, President Reagan's nominee to succeed Justice Powell, was defeated in the newly
Democratic Senate; it seems likely that a Republican Senate would have confirmed Bork.
23. Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft vol. 2, 967 (Farrar &
Rinehart 1939). Taft, despite having served as President, seems not to have been a
successful political prognosticator. The "Bolshevik" in the White House at the time was
President Hoover, who surely named a new Chief Justice (Hughes) more attuned to Taft's
views than would have Hoover's successor, President Franklin Roosevelt.
24. Alpheas Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 800 (Viking Press
1956); id at 805-06.
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age ninety to retire, but waited no more after a liberal President
was in office.25
Surely it strains credulity to think that Justices who have
worked for decades to develop legal and Constitutional doctrines
are indifferent concerning whether the Court will build on, or
disregard, those doctrines. Surely, at least frequently, Justices
take account of the political situation that will determine their
successors.
I submit that an outgoing Justice exercising indirect
influence over the naming of his successor is both an
unavoidable, and a wholly undesirable, consequence of life
tenure. It is quite enough of a concession to judicial
independence to say that Justices will, for so long as they
choose, be part of a small group that exercises vast power to
make unreviewable decisions that shape basic policies for the
country. It goes much too far to allow those individuals, in
effect, to pass on such power to like-minded successors by the
timing of their retirements. To state the problem in terms of a
single individual, it is quite enough that Justice Stevens enjoyed
totally unchecked power for a third of a century, without then
allowing him to hand off power to Justice Kagan for perhaps
another third of a century.
B. Unbalanced Power of Presidents to Shape the Court
Even if we assumed that Justices left the Court entirely for
personal reasons, with no intent to influence the identity or
philosophy of their successors, we would be opting for a system
that distributes to Presidents (with Senate oversight) the
enormous power to shape the Court on a random basis. A voter
chooses among Presidential candidates on a range of issues,
including the important power to shape the Supreme Court
25. Souter retired in 2009, Stevens in 2010. I would suggest that both left as soon as
was reasonably possible after Obama became President, but Stevens waited a year because
of a tradition that two Justices not leave the Court in the same year. (Obviously, there are
exceptions to the tradition, such as in 2005, but usually not for routine retirement decisions.
In 2005, Justice O'Connor announced her retirement, President George W. Bush
nominated John Roberts to replace her as Associate Justice, and then Chief Justice
Rehnquist died. While O'Connor would likely have delayed her retirement had Rehnquist
died before she announced it, in the event Bush filled the two vacancies simultaneously,
naming Roberts as Chief Justice and Samuel Alito to replace O'Connor.)
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through appointments. 2 6 But it is random whether the issue is a
real one or not, because whether a given election matters to the
future of the Court depends on the unknown, personal retirement
decisions of Justices. There is no triumph of logic in a system
that allows President Nixon four appointments in five-plus
years, and President Carter none in four. And, of course, if we
drop the pretense that the Justices' retirement decisions are
simply random choices made for entirely personal reasons, the
present system becomes even harder to defend.
My preferred system would establish a term of eighteen
years, with an appointment coming every two years. All
involved would know that a Presidential election would carry
the power to name exactly two full-term Justices to the Court.
(The President would also have the power to name replacements
for Justices who left before their terms expired, but such
replacements would serve out only the unexpired portion of the
term.")
C. Other Problems Arising from Life Tenure
While Justices' power to manipulate the appointment of
their replacements is the most serious adverse consequence of
life tenure, and the (at best) random dispersal of the power to
shape the Court through appointment is a significant
shortcoming, life tenure causes a number of lesser problems. In
general, these arise from Justices who, enjoying life tenure,
choose to serve for very long periods of time.
1. Justices May Stay Past Their Prime Years.
Objectively viewed, Justices are now staying on the Court
26. See e.g. Noah Feldman, The Court's the Thing, Ark. Democrat-Gaz. B6 (Little
Rock, Ark.) (Nov. 1, 2012) (arguing that in 2012, "[a] reasonable person could vote on the
basis of future Supreme Court nominations alone-because on almost everything else that
matters, the differences between the candidates are going to be vanishingly small when put
into practice," in part because "presidents don't get to implement the majority of their most
important domestic policies without Congress, and Congress is not going to back either
side in making radical changes").
27. Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to
Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47
Ohio St. L.J. 799, 811-12 (1986).
LIFE TENURE ON THE SUPREME COURT
longer than has traditionally been the case. According to a recent
compilation, Justices who left the Court in the 1970-2005 period
had averaged over twenty-six years in office. This compares to
an average of less than fifteen years throughout our previous
history, and of less than fifteen years through the first seventy
years of the twentieth century. But does "longer" equal "too
long"? An exhaustive review of the Court's entire historical
record appears to suggest that the answer is "yes." Although the
problem of Justices' "mental decrepitude" dates back to the
Washington Administration, Professor David Garrow
demonstrates that the problem has been growing over time.29
Over the years, many reform proposals have been put
forward that are, in general, justified on the same rationale that
generally supports forced retirement-namely, that the
incumbent may otherwise stay on past his prime. States
frequently take the approach of establishing a maximum age.
The typical proposal for change to the federal rule of life tenure
would establish a fixed term, or a maximum age, or both.3 ° I am
28. Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life
Tenure Reconsidered, in Reforming the Court: Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices 16
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., Carolina Academic Press 2006) [hereinafter
Reforming the Court].
29. Professor Garrow, who proposes a Constitutional amendment mandating retirement
from the Court at age 75, provides a detailed account of every instance of mental
decrepitude in the Court's history. His conclusion includes the following tally:
While the pre-twentieth-century Court featured at least four justices-Baldwin,
Grier, Clifford, and Field-and perhaps two more-Rutledge and Cushing-
whose mental incapacity should have barred their continued service, the
twentieth-century Court has featured eleven justices whose mental decrepitude
or mentally infirm judgment should have led to their departure years or months
before they did vacate their seats. Prior to World War II, both Chief Justices
Fuller and Taft, and Justices McKenna and Holmes, all remained on the Court
longer than their colleagues and relatives knew was in the public interest. Since
World War II, two Justices-Murphy and Whittaker-suffered from conditions
which should have precluded their ongoing service, and five others-Minton,
Black, Douglas, Powell, and Marshall-all overstayed the length of service their
mental energies were capable of delivering.
David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the US. Supreme Court: The Historical Case for
a 28th Amendment, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 995, 1084-85 (2000) (emphasis in original).
The analysis of Professors Calabresi and Lindgren, focusing on the period since
1970, also suggests a growing problem as compared to historical averages: "[O]n average,
a decrepit justice retired every fifteen years before 1970; since 1970, a decrepit justice has
retired every seven years." Calabresi & Lindgren, supra n. 28, at 42.
30. Professor Garrow's analysis of decrepit Justices is put forward to support his own
proposal for mandatory retirement at age seventy-five. See generally Garrow, supra n. 29.
In the course of his historical discussion, he discusses a number of reform proposals,
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sympathetic to these proposals, and would support them as
compared to the status quo. Nonetheless, such proposals are
insufficient because they do not fully deal with the biggest
single problem of the present system, that of Justices who may
time their departure from the Court to influence the appointment
of a like-minded successor.
3 1
2. Justices May Cease to Reflect the Political Understandings
under which They Were Appointed and Confirmed.
A closely related problem of the Justice who stays on too
long is the idea that a Justice's tenure on the Court may long
outlive the political understanding that resulted in his
appointment and confirmation. As discussed above, Justices
enjoy essentially complete independence from political
processes while on the Court, but they go on the Court as the
result of intensely political calculations. As such, a new Justice
represents the political balance of the time. But what of a Justice
who has served for thirty years? The political understandings
may have changed, and, equally important, the Justice's
philosophy may have undergone considerable change
unforeseen at the time of appointment and confirmation. Perhaps
the tenuous balance between a tie to, and independence from,
the country's political processes is upset when a Justice remains
on the Court for an unusually long time.
3. Presidential Choices May Be Skewed by Life Tenure.
Life tenure may also have a pernicious effect on
Presidential appointment decisions. Presidents obviously view
particularly those that have been offered by members of Congress. As might be expected
from Congress, the idea has waxed and waned with public attention; for example, a number
of proposals were offered shortly after President Franklin Roosevelt's ill-fated "Court-
packing" plan. Id. at 1023-26. A number of academic proposals are included in Reforming
the Court, supra n. 28. For discussion of other academic proposals, and of foreign practice,
see Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of
Article I1 Judges, 95 Geo. L.J. 965, 1000-02 (2007).
31. For example, had a fixed eighteen-year term applied to Chief Justice Warren, he
would have been appointed in 1953 to a term to end in 1971. But if he wanted his
replacement to be named by President Johnson (as he clearly did; see supra n. 21), he
could have retired in 1968, allowing Johnson to name a successor who would serve until
1986, or thirty-three years after Warren's initial appointment.
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the appointment of Justices as important political and policy
decisions, and recognize that the Justices chosen may continue
to forward the appointing President's views for years, perhaps
decades, after the President leaves office. It is to be supposed
that a President will prefer to exert greater rather than lesser
influence on the future decisions of the Court. A means of doing
this is to nominate relatively young Justices, a practice that may
be problematic. No doubt, there is the occasional wunderkind
who would make an excellent Justice-and, as noted above,
Justices who stay on the Court to a very advanced age pose the
risk of mental decrepitude. Nonetheless, a traditional view is
that wisdom grows with age and life experience. In any case, it
is certainly more difficult to evaluate nominees who have lived
fewer years and done fewer things. A Presidential preference for
younger nominees would be reinforced because a younger
nominee would be less likely to have created a paper trail that
could be used by political opponents in the confirmation
process. Interestingly, even in the highly contentious politics of
the present, opponents appear to believe that they can justify
defeating a President's Supreme Court nominee only if they can
argue that something is "wrong" with the nominee. In such an
atmosphere, and particularly since Judge Robert Bork's
extensive writings were turned against him in his 1987
confirmation hearings, Presidents may prefer so-called "stealth"
nominees to the Court,32 individuals without substantial records
that might be used by opponents.
4. Infrequent Openings on the Court May Increase Political
Rancor.
Supreme Court confirmation proceedings in recent decades
have been more contentious than had long been the case.33 Some
32. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra n. 28, at 40 n. 73 (citing Akhil Reed Amar & Vikrarn
David Amar, Should U.S. Supreme Court Justices be Term-Limited? A Dialogue
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/amar/20020823.html (Aug. 23, 2002)).
33. Thomas Halper, Senate Rejection of Supreme Court Nominees, 22 Drake L. Rev.
102, 102 (1972) (noting that in the seventy-four-year span from 1894 to 1968, every
nominee save one-John J. Parker in 1930-was confirmed). This long period of Senate
quiescence has not been the norm. See Laurence Tribe, God Save This Honorable Court 78
(Random House 1985) (noting that "the Senate has rejected a higher proportion of
presidential nominations for Supreme Court Justice than for any other national office," and
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commentators contend that the infrequency of appointment-and-
confirmation processes-an obvious consequence of Justices
staying on the Court longer-increase the partisan rancor,
because so much rides on each nomination. I mention this
factor because others have raised it; personally, however, I do
not think that shortening tenures to fifteen or eighteen years-an
eternity in politics-will do much to reduce political bickering
in Washington. As I see it, the rancor arises primarily because
politicians and the public alike are now fully aware that the
emperor has no clothes-at least since the Warren Court, the
Court is recognized on all sides to be not simply a neutral
interpreter of law, but an important political player.
Accordingly, a seat on the Court, even for a term of years, is a
prize worth fighting over.
IV. PRESENT CONDITIONS ARE CONDUCIVE TO
JUSTICES STAYING ON THE COURT.
As noted above, the average tenure of Justices has
substantially lengthened in recent decades, even in the face of a
relatively recent guarantee of salary continued for life in
retirement. Given the problems of lengthy tenure, it is worth
considering why that is so. The starting point must be a
recognition that people, all over the world, seemingly from the
dawn of history, have always been reluctant to give up great
that "[a]lmost one out of every five nominees to the Court has failed to gain the Senate's
'consent') (emphasis in original). A qualification is necessary. Professor Halper's
tabulation indicates that a slight majority of these failed nominations have not been the
result of Senate votes, but because the nomination was withdrawn. Halper, supra this note,
at 103, tbl. 1 ("Supreme Court Nominees Rejected by the Senate") (showing that from
1794 to 1970, thirteen nominations were "withdrawn or not voted on"). It may be fair to
include the withdrawals in the tabulation of rejections, on the theory that the most frequent
reason for a nomination's withdrawal is that Senate confirmation seems unlikely.
The most important predictor for a smooth confirmation is likely to be whether the
Senate is controlled by the President's party. See note 22, supra, for discussion of this
factor as influencing the timing of Chief Justice Burger's retirement.
34. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra n. 28, at 39 (arguing that "the irregular occurrence
of vacancies on the Supreme Court means that when one does arise, the stakes are
enormous, for neither the President nor the Senate can know when the next vacancy might
arise. Moreover, a successful nominee has the potential to stay on the Court for a very long
(and uncertain) period of time. So much is at stake in appointing a new justice that the
President and the Senate (especially when controlled by the party opposite the President)
inevitably get drawn into a political fight.").
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power. (This holds true for American politicians, but they have
to convince voters that they should be continued in office.
Supreme Court Justices, enjoying life tenure, need convince
only themselves.) This reluctance has presumably affected
Supreme Court Justices since 1789. What is new is that the
burden of serving on the Court has lessened in recent decades,
while the attractions have increased.
We do not have to go back to the days when Justices rode
circuit on horseback to find a time when they worked
significantly harder than today. The Court's workload, at least as
measured by decided cases, is down markedly from a generation
ago. In the 2010 Term-the most recent for which the Harvard
Law Review has published its annual survey-the Court decided
only eighty-two cases with full opinion, including seven per
curium opinions. (This was not an atypically light year; in the
preceding three years it had averaged seventy-eight cases per
year.) Twenty-five years earlier, in the 1985 Term, the Court
decided almost twice as many cases-159-with full opinion.
(Again, this total was typical for the era, exactly matching its
average over the preceding three years.35) With the reduced
caseload, not only do Justices write fewer opinions, but they
need also prepare for and attend fewer oral arguments.
The Justices' job is primarily to decide cases. This is an
important job, and difficult choices are daily fare. No doubt
most people would find making these decisions enormously
stressful. Justices, presumably, are not "most people." If a
Justice finds making decisions a source of undue strain, surely
he has gone into the wrong line of work.
35. These data are taken from The Supreme Court, 2010 Term, The Statistics, 125
Harv. L. Rev. 362 (2011) (Table I(A): "Actions of Individual Justices") [hereinafter 2010
Statistics], and from corresponding statistical tables for earlier Terms. See The Supreme
Court, 2009 Term, The Statistics, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2010) (Table I(A): "Actions of
Individual Justices," showing eighty-seven cases); The Supreme Court, 2008 Term, The
Statistics, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 382 (2009) (Table I(A): "Actions of Individual Justices,"
showing seventy-eight cases); The Supreme Court, 2007 Term, The Statistics, 122 Harv. L.
Rev. 516 (2008) (Table I(A): "Actions of Individual Justices," showing seventy cases);
The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, The Statistics, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 304 (1986) (Table I(A):
"Actions of Individual Justices," showing 159 cases) [hereinafter 1985 Statistics]; The
Supreme Court, 1984 Term, The Statistics, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 322 (1985) (Table I(A):
"Actions of Individual Justices," showing 151 cases); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, The
Statistics, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 307 (1984) (Table I(A): "Actions of Individual Justices,"
showing 163 cases); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, The Statistics, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 295
(1983) (Table 1 (A): "Actions of Individual Justices," showing 162 cases).
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However difficult deciding a case may be, supporting the
decisions need not be terribly hard. By the time a case arrives at
the Supreme Court, meticulously briefed by both parties and
frequently by amici, and with opinions of lower courts available,
it appears that a Justice will primarily be called upon to decide
which plausible, well-researched, and well-developed argument
to accept.
Writing opinions need not be difficult for the Justices,
either. Each Justice has four intelligent and energetic young
clerks fully capable of providing a polished first draft for the
Justice's review.
Reviews of certiorari petitions, potentially the most
burdensome part of the job, are considerably eased by the multi-
Justice cert pool. And, again, most of the burden can be placed
on the very able law clerks.
And what of the pluses of Supreme Court service? Justices
have become the rock stars of the legal world. Any Justice who
wishes can spend a week or two doing light duty over the
summer at some law school's program in Geneva or Florence or
Madrid, with the Justice's mere presence all the school really
requires. Visits to law schools and speeches to legal audiences
are simply the appearances of royalty before the fawning
masses.
In short, the work is interesting, and it allows for the
exercise of great power. At the same time, it is not arduous.
Most of the Justice's face-to-face interactions will be cordial
and, outside the confines of the Court, deferential. Why retire?
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Constitutional Amendment
The most obvious solution to the problems posed by life
tenure is to end life tenure. A quarter of a century ago, I
advanced a detailed proposal for staggered eighteen-year
terms.36 Each Presidential election would have essentially equal
weight in shaping the Court. In order to block strategically
timed early retirements, my proposal provided that if a Justice
36. See generally Oliver, supra n. 27.
LIFE TENURE ON THE SUPREME COURT
left the Court before his term ended, his replacement would (in
most cases) only serve out his unexpired term. I still like my
proposal. However, it would require a Constitutional
amendment, and the Constitution is hard to amend.
B. Statute
More recently, proponents of similar arrangements have
suggested that life tenure could effectively be ended by statute.
Professors Paul Carrington and Roger Cramton have proposed a
system in which a new Justice would be appointed every two
years.37 If this resulted in more than nine Justices-which would
result if, as at present, the average tenure exceeded eighteen
years-only the nine most junior would have full powers of
Justices, and the more senior Justices would have markedly
lesser roles. Such a proposal would achieve most of the goals
that I sought through my proposed Constitutional amendment,
without the necessity of an amendment. I support the proposal
on the merits. However, because it can be viewed as effectively
ending life tenure, it is far from clear that it would be
Constitutional.3
But there are statutory approaches, undoubtedly
Constitutional, that could overcome some of the detriments of
life tenure. I have proposed simply expanding the size of the
Court, a clearly Constitutional route that Congress has followed
several times in the past.39 I suggested adding a new Justice
every two years, regardless of whether a Justice had retired, and
simply allowing the Court to grow to whatever size resulted. In
theory, we could allow for a new Justice every year, though this
might require additional political arrangements to avoid a single
President, particularly a two-term President, exerting too much
control over the makeup of the Court.4 0 Such an arrangement
37. Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A
Return to Basic Principles, in Reforming the Court, supra n. 28, at 467.
38. Professor Epstein finds the proposal "highly desirable on policy grounds" but
believes it would be unconstitutional. Richard A. Epstein, Mandatory Retirement for
Supreme Court Justices, in Reforming the Court, supra n. 28, at 415,415-16.
39. Philip D. Oliver, Increasing the Size of the Court as a Partial but Clearly
Constitutional Alternative, in Reforming the Court, supra n. 28, at 405.
40. A new Justice coming on the Court every year would be problematic in the early
years. If, for example, the practice were implemented in 2016, a President elected for two
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would assure that every Presidential election carried roughly the
same influence on the Court. With the Court growing in size,
each Justice's importance would be reduced, and strategic
retirements would become correspondingly less important. And
the Court's growing size, by diminishing the importance of each
Justice, might lead to Justices voluntarily leaving earlier,
reducing the likelihood of mental decrepitude and of a Justice
staying on the Court far beyond the time of the political
understandings that had led to his appointment. However, such a
statutory approach may prove almost as difficult to obtain as a
Constitutional amendment. Unless it were bipartisan-which is
fairly hard to see in the present climate-it is likely to be seen as
a modem version of the Court-packing plan that President
Franklin Roosevelt advanced in 1937. And, absent the rarity of
the President's party controlling the House of Representatives
and sixty votes in the Senate (necessary to overcome a
filibuster), such an important change will likely be impossible
except on a bipartisan basis.
Congress could increase the Court's currently low case
load. As noted above, the Court is deciding only half the number
of cases it decided a generation ago, despite the fact that our
law, society, and economy seem no less complex or
contentious. Congress-which gave the Court control over its
own docket less than a century ago42 -could effectively increase
the Court's workload by insisting that it accept more cases.
Another body, such as a rotating group of judges from the
Courts of Appeal, could be empowered to select cases that the
Court would be required to review. At least so long as the Court
terms and serving from 2017 to 2025 would be able to name a majority of the Court
(assuming at least two Justices on the 2016 Court left during the eight-year period). Once
the practice was fully phased in, however, the Court might have twenty-five or even thirty
Justices, and a two-term President's having eight appointments might not seem excessive.
41. The lower workload is not attributable to fewer litigants seeking review by the
Court, but rather to the Court's choosing to accept fewer cases. In the 2010 Term, the Court
granted review to 4.7 percent of its appellate docket and 0.2 percent of its miscellaneous
docket; twenty-five years earlier, it granted review to 11.2 percent of its appellate docket
and 1.3 percent of its miscellaneous docket. See 2010 Statistics, supra n. 35, at 369 (Table
2(B): "Cases Granted Review"); 1985 Statistics, supra n. 35, at 308 (Table 2: "Final
Disposition of Cases").
42. See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections
Seventy-Five Years after the Judges' Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643 (2000).
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continued to have the power to accept cases on its own, such a
step should be Constitutional. If Justices found their increased
work load onerous, retirement might become more attractive,
thus undermining life tenure to some degree.
Some of these steps--especially those that entail increasing
the size of the Court-would have the effect of reducing the
rock-star status of individual Justices. Along these lines,
Congress could even move the Court out of Washington. In this
era of easy transportation and communication, there is no
necessity for the Court to sit in the capital. After President
Obama's tongue-lashing of the Court during his 2010 State of
the Union address following the Court's Citizens United
decision, former Justice O'Connor predicted that fewer Justices
would attend in the future.43 But a relevant question might be:
What justification is there for the supposedly non-political
Justices to rub elbows with elected officials, and to listen to the
President's political program? Why not move the Court to fly-
over country-to Omaha, for example, which is good enough
for Warren Buffett? Or, I am confident, the Court would be
welcomed in Little Rock. In either city, the Justices' pay checks




One route is open that is relatively easy to implement,
because it can be implemented unilaterally by a single party-
and a party in the minority, at that. That route is the filibuster. A
block of forty-one Senators-and the party in opposition usually
has more than that--can block consideration of a Justice. Would
this be illegitimate? Perhaps not. Once we recognize that
Justices are important political actors who will make important
political decisions for many years-that is, that they do much
43. Associated Press Brief, More State of the Union No-Shows Predicted, 159 N.Y.
Times A19 (Apr. 7, 2010).
44. In the past, Chief Justice Roberts has gone so far as to portray the low pay of
federal judges overall as "a constitutional crisis that threatens to undermine the strength
and independence of the federal judiciary." See 2006 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary at 1, http://www.uscourts.gov/News/The Third Branch/07-01-01/2006_Year-End
_Report on theFederalJudiciary.aspx (Jan. 1, 2007).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
more than call balls and strikes-we should reexamine the
assumption that the President's nominees should be more-or-less
automatically confirmed unless the opposition finds something
"wrong" with the nominee. 45 One thing in favor of legitimating
opposition based on ideology and judicial philosophy is that
these are usually the actual bases for opposition. Acknowledging
the legitimacy of what actually happens-and not requiring a
pretense that the opposition is due to some supposed ethical
failing or because the nominee is totally beyond the pale-will
make the process somewhat more honest.
It is reasonable to view the Senate's role differently in
passing on judicial nominees as compared to other confirmation
proceedings. A strong presumption in favor of confirmation
logically follows for nominees who are to assist the President in
carrying out the executive functions during the President's
administration-cabinet secretaries and ambassadors, for
example. Whether the presumption properly attaches to judicial
nominees, who serve in a different branch of government and
whose term of office routinely extends many years beyond that
of the President who nominates them, is a quite different
question. I think the different question should be answered
differently.46
Using the filibuster against Supreme Court nominees will
likely constitute a crossing of the Rubicon. Once a full-scale,
acknowledged filibuster is used by an opposition party against a
President's Supreme Court nominee, the filibuster will almost
certainly be used by the other party when the shoe is on the
other foot. Use of the filibuster risks further politicizing the
45. For a defense of the traditional viewpoint, see Michael M. Gallagher, Disarming
the Confirmation Process, 50 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 513, 550 (2002-03) (arguing that
"[s]ignificant historical evidence proves that the Framers did not intend Senators to
examine a nominee's judicial philosophy as a criterion for confirmation," and that "[o]nly
compelling reasons justify rejection of a nomination, and a nominee's ideology is not one
of those reasons"). Mr. Gallagher quotes Alexander Hamilton: "[I]t is not likely that their
sanction would often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the
refusal." Id n. 290 (quoting The Federalist No. 76 at 425 (Alexander Hamilton)) (emphasis
added by Mr. Gallagher).
46. By this reasoning, perhaps the Senate should give an intermediate level of scrutiny
to the President's nominees to various administrative positions who, if confirmed, would
not serve at the pleasure of the President, and whose term-though fixed in years, and not
for life-would not end with the President's. One might think of the Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
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Court, and perhaps leaving a seat open for a considerable period
of time before a political deadlock is resolved. Political deadlock
already has the effect of lengthy vacancies in judicial positions
on inferior courts.
But the filibuster offers significant potential benefits.
Perhaps counterintuitively, the filibuster could have the effect of
somewhat depoliticizing Supreme Court appointments.
Presidents might be forced to name more centrist Justices in
order to win confirmation. Or, the President might work with the
opposition to name one Justice preferred by the President, and
another more to the liking of the opposition. That could be the
case, particularly, if the filibuster were linked with a statute to
increase the regularity of Justices being named to the Court,
perhaps by adding a new Justice each year. The opposition
might approve the President's nominee this year based on an
agreement identifying a more acceptable Justice for the next
year's slot. Each Justice would be part of a larger Court, and
thus less of a rock star, but that is not a loss to the Republic.
VI. CONCLUSION
The anti-democratic nature of life tenure is an historical
anachronism. If its anti-democratic nature were its only
drawback, that might be tolerated to protect the Court's
independence from political pressure. Life tenure, however,
causes other problems, the most significant of which is the
power of Justices to influence the identity of their successors by
the timing of their retirement decisions.
Life tenure should be ended-with fixed but lengthy terms
assuring substantial judicial independence-and a Constitutional
amendment would be the cleanest way to effect the change.
Unfortunately, given the difficulty of amending the Constitution,
it would also be the hardest to achieve. Various statutory
measures might provide at least partial relief of the problems
posed by life tenure, but a meaningful statute would, itself, be
difficult to enact.
The simplest solution would be to legitimate the filibuster.
Such an approach might move the Court to the center, forcing
Presidents to nominate relatively moderate Justices in order to
win confirmation. Use of the filibuster in confirmations might
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also ease the passage of helpful statutes, particularly statutes that
would allow for regular appointments of new Justices unrelated
to the retirement decisions of existing Justices.
